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ABSTRACT Near Field Communication (NFC) has become prevalent in access control and contactless
payment systems, however, there is evidence in the literature to suggest that the technology possesses
numerous vulnerabilities. Contactless bank cards are becoming commonplace in society; while there are
many benefits from the use of contactless payments, there are also security issues present that could be
exploited by a malicious third party. The inherently short operating distance of NFC (typically about 4 cm)
is often relied upon as a means of ensuring intentional interaction on the user’s part and limiting attack
vectors. However, NFC is particularly sensitive to relay attacks, which entirely negate the security usefulness
of the short-range aspect of technology. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how standard hardware
can be used to exploit the technology to carry out a relay attack. Considering the risk that relay attacks
pose, a countermeasure is proposed to mitigate this threat. Our countermeasure yields a 100% detection
rate in experiments undertaken – in which over 10,000 contactless transactions were carried out on a
range of different contactless cards and devices. In these experiments, there was a false positive rate of
0.38% – 0.86%. As little as 1 in every 250 transactions were falsely classified as being the subject of a relay
attack and so the user experience was not significantly impacted. With our countermeasure implemented,
transaction time was lengthened by only 0.22 seconds.
INDEX TERMS Near field communication, relay attack, security.

I. INTRODUCTION

NFC encompasses a set of close proximity wireless communication technologies that facilitate simple communication
and data exchanges between coupled devices. The technology
is found in a wide range of devices including smartphones,
credit cards and other smartcards, interactive advertisement
posters, and gaming figurines [1]. Among its many applications are contactless payment, access control, and automated fare collection. Launched in 2002, it has since become
commonplace in modern society and is continually finding
its way into an ever-increasing number of applications and
devices. NFC’s market penetration has largely been catalysed
by the smartphone industry embedding the technology in
their devices in recent years. Both Google and Apple, whose
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Mohamed Elhoseny
190108

.

Android (86.8%) and iOS (13.2%) mobile operating systems
collectively accounted for 100% of the smartphone OS market share in Q3 2018 [2], launched NFC-based contactless
payment applications [3], [4] for their smartphone platforms.
With industry adoption ever-increasing, it is prudent that the
technology is secure.
Many of NFC’s security-sensitive applications rely on the
inherently short operating distance of the technology as a
means of ensuring intentional interaction with other NFC
devices and preventing eavesdropping and other attacks that
wireless communication technologies typically are vulnerable to. The literature argues that reliance on this premise
is unfounded. NFC technology has been shown to be susceptible to several attack vectors including relay attacks [5],
[6], replay attacks [7], eavesdropping [8], and side-channel
attacks [9]. Many instances of relay attacks on NFC have been
published which is particularly concerning [10], [11]. A relay
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attack entirely diminishes the security usefulness of the shortrange aspect of NFC. In an attack of this kind, communication
between reader and tag is intercepted by an attacker and
the transmissions from one are passed to the other via the
attacker. With an attacker using two devices to relay transmissions (one between the reader and attacker, and another
between the tag and attacker) the range of the communication
is only limited by the attacker’s ability to form a communication channel between the two relay devices. Importantly this
communication channel need not be over NFC, and could be
over WiFi or wireless mobile telecommunication networks
(3G/4G), for example. This effectively removes any security
benefit from NFC devices normally having to be in close
proximity of one another.
The main contributions in this article are as follows:
1) Implementation of a known relay attack on NFC to
show how the technology can be exploited by a malicious third party.
2) Proposal of a novel countermeasure to prevent relay
attacks at the application layer using the ISO/IEC
7816-4 protocol.
3) Definition of a formal model of the countermeasure and
implementation of a realistic prototype.
4) Design and execution of rigorous empirical tests to
validate the new countermeasure.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: The
technical background, Section II, provides the reader with a
knowledge of the fundamental operating principles behind
NFC technology and the technical standards applicable to it.
Section III begins by explaining the concept of a relay attack
and goes on to detail our implementation of one on NFC.
In Section IV, we propose our countermeasure to mitigate
the threat of relay attacks on NFC technology. An evaluation
of the performance and effectiveness of our countermeasure,
and the setting in which it was tested, can be found in
Section V. A review of the literature in the field of relay
attack countermeasures is provided in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes the findings of this paper and outlines
potential lines of future research.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

NFC is a wireless communication technology closely related
to the High Frequency (HF) subset of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). Sharing many of the same characteristics,
NFC also operates on the 13.56 MHz carrier frequency and
accordingly has a short operating distance, generally less
than 10 cm [12]. The driving force behind this new technology was the need for bi-directional peer-to-peer communication between devices, which HF-RFID lacked. NFC was
designed to remain backwards compatible and, in modern
usage, the term typically encompasses HF-RFID technology.
Contactless NFC devices can be broadly classified under
one of two headings based on whether they have their own
power source or not. Those that do are known as ‘‘Active’’
devices and have more functionality available to them; their
VOLUME 8, 2020

counterpart, devices that do not have any internal power
source and rely on an Active device to externally power them,
are termed ‘‘Passive’’ devices. This gives rise to the two
modes of communication possible in NFC, dictated by the
devices used in a transaction. Active communication mode
features two Active devices which use their own RF fields
to communicate, each modulating their respective RF fields.
Passive communication mode is used when communication is
desired between an Active and a Passive device. The Active
device always initiates the transaction by generating an RF
field. The Passive device responds by modulating the Active
device’s RF field, a technique known as load modulation.
Communication between two Passive devices is not possible
as by definition neither device has an independent power
source and could not generate an RF field. Within a transaction, the device which starts the communication is referred to
as the ‘‘Initiator’’ and is always an Active device. The respondent, coined the ‘‘Target’’, may be either Active or Passive.
NFC is disparate in its method of operation in comparison to other widespread wireless communication technologies, such as the 802.11 (wireless LAN) and, more closely
related, 802.15 (wireless PAN) families [13]. Typically these
technologies transmit information over the air through the
modulation of periodic radio waves that they generate. As not
all NFC devices have an internal battery or fixed external
power supply, independent radio wave generation cannot be
assumed. The technology places an onus on Active devices to
wirelessly power their Passive counterparts. This is achieved
through inductive coupling whereby a change in the current
flowing through the loop antenna of the Active device induces
a voltage across the Passive device’s antenna. The Biot-Savart
law [14] provides that a flow of charges giving rise to a
current across a loop correspondingly provokes a magnetic
field. Changes in this current accordingly causes a change in
the magnetic flux of the loop’s magnetic field which, under
Faraday’s laws of electromagnetic induction [15], induces
an electromotive force on a coupled loop. As this is a nonradiative method of wireless power transfer relying on changing magnetic fields, it’s operation is limited to the near-field
region of a generated RF field, which is where the technology
derives its name from. The antennae used by NFC devices are
too small to allow a standing wave to propagate on the carrier
frequency which precludes the use of the far-field region of
the RF field. Since the near-field is the only concern, NFC
antennae are designed as loop-type inductors as opposed to
conventional antennae.
Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol
(NFCIP-1) is the governing standard for NFC technologies
and is defined by the ISO/IEC 18092 and ECMA-340 technical standards. Bit rates of 106, 212, and 424 kbit/s are
supported by the standard for both communication modes,
though bit rates of up to 6,780 kbit/s are possible in active
communication mode however modulation and bit coding
are unspecified beyond 424 kbit/s. Manchester coding with
a 10% Amplitude-Shift Keying (ASK) modulation scheme
is used in all cases with the exception of Active devices
190109
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transmitting at 106 kbit/s where a modified Miller coding
with a 100% ASK modulation scheme is employed. NFC
also encompasses Proximity Card technology (comprising
of Proximity Coupling Device (PCD) and Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (PICC) devices), defined by the ISO/IEC
14443 family of standards, and Vicinity Card technology,
defined by ISO/IEC 15693. The NFC Forum, a collaborative
industry association created to advance, develop and bring
about compliance with NFC standards among its members,
has also released an additional 20 standards for the technology [16]. Application layer protocols can occasionally
be vendor specific but more commonly the ISO/IEC 7816-4
application protocol is adopted. The main abstraction of
this protocol is the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU)
communication unit, grouped into command and response
categories.
III. RELAY ATTACK

A relay attack is analogous to the ‘Chess Grandmaster’ problem [17]. The problem presents a novice player, N , with
little to no knowledge of the rules of the game, and two
chess grandmasters, G1 and G2. Player N is tasked with
defeating a chess grandmaster, though without ability to play
the game let alone having any game strategy, the odds of
him succeeding seem infinitesimally small. This does not
deter N however and so he devises a plan. N challenges
two chess grandmasters to play against him; they both accept
the invitation. Both games have been set up so that they are
played simultaneously and at the same venue with G1 to
the left of N and G2 to his right. In the game against G1,
N plays black, while against G2, N plays white. The game
against G1 starts first and as white makes the first move, G1
plays his opening move. N then turns around and starts the
game against G2, mimicking the move made by G1 from
the first game of chess. G2 then makes a move in response
to N ’s play. N then returns to the first game of chess and
copies the move made by G2. He then waits for G1’s response
before returning to the second game and mimicking G1’s
move against G2 once again. This process continues and in
doing so it essentially becomes a case of G1 playing against
G2; however, as N has split the gameplay into two games in
which he is the opponent in both, N will succeed in his task
of defeating a chess grandmaster. In all cases, except for a
stalemate, N is guaranteed to win against either G1 or G2
while conceding to the other. This scenario in fact depicts a
classical example of a relay attack; N simply relays the moves
of one chess grandmaster against the other.
Extrapolating this concept to modern communication technology, the idea behind a relay attack is that communication
between two parties is intercepted by an attacker who breaks
the direct communication path and relays messages to each
party via the attacker’s relay device(s). Quite often there
is no other aspect to this attack – no message alteration,
packet inspection, etc. Although simplistic, its usefulness
to an attacker and, consequently, danger to an unwilling
subject can’t be understated. As a wireless communication
190110

technology with security applications such as contactless
payment and access control, a relay attack poses a real danger
to the security of the technology. NFC is particularly sensitive
to relay attacks. The NFC forum states that as ‘‘NFC transmissions are short range’’, they are ‘‘inherently secure’’ [18]
but there are instances, such as on a busy bus or train, where
an attacker would be in range to engage in an NFC transaction
with a victim’s credit card. Both reader and card assume that
when they are in close proximity of one another, a connection
should be established over NFC. In the case of access control
systems, this assumption goes a step further and assumes that
access should be granted (if that tag normally has right of
entry at that location). This is by design as NFC is a usercentric technology and it is believed that the ‘‘very short
distance’’ of the technology implies that you must make
an intentional action to interact with an application over
NFC [18]. This does undoubtedly improve the user experience but at the cost of security, and arguably is more of a vulnerability than design feature. A successful implementation
of a relay attack allows the attacker to use the victim’s card
to purchase something completely unbeknown to the victim.
A. RELAY ATTACK IMPLEMENTATION

The relay attack used in our study was developed on the
Android platform using devices readily available. Lee’s [19]
app ‘NFCProxy’ served as the foundation for the software
developed to facilitate this attack.
Figure 1 depicts an active relay attack. For the purposes of
this example, a contactless payment system is the subject of
the relay attack. In this scenario, the attacker is in possession
of two smartphones b and c; the first b running NFCProxy
in Relay mode (referred to as ‘NFCRelay’) and the second
c running it in Proxy mode. In our execution of this attack
we used an Asus Nexus 7 device for b and a Sony Xperia
T smartphone for c. NFCRelay hosts a server on device b;
the proxy device c opens a socket and connects to b when
a Proximity Coupling Device (PCD) is detected over NFC.
Both devices must be connected to the same wireless network.
The attack is executed as follows:
• Prior to approaching a PCD (e.g. a contactless payment
terminal) with c, the relay device b is brought in range
of an NFC-enabled credit/debit card a.
• NFCRelay will report detection of this card if an NFC
connection is successfully established.
• At this point the attacker can proceed with paying for a
purchase and approach the contactless payment terminal
with the proxy device c.
• Data is exchanged between the credit card a and the PCD
d via relay devices b and c over a WiFi connection.
• The transaction completes and the relay attack was successful.
An entire transaction performed through this relay attack
setup takes on average 1 - 4 seconds to complete.
This relay attack operates on the application layer, forwarding APDUs rather than frames. An advantage of this
attack style over ISO/IEC 14443 protocol relay attacks is
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of relay attack.

that the proxy and relay devices could in theory issue wait
time extension requests in their own right thus bypassing
more stringent time constraints that can be imposed on lower
layers. It also avoids Unique Identifier (UID) mismatches as
the APDUs are encapsulated in a new ISO/IEC 14443 frame
with the UID of the proxy or relay device that established the
connection.
In theory this attack should be transferable to any Android
device with an NFC chipset, however certain co-requisites
exist that presently aren’t available for all Android devices.
The proxy device must run a version of CyanogenMod
Android OS. In addition, the Android framework used by this
version of CyanogenMod must contain the IsoPcdA class,
to allow the proxy device to emulate an NFC-A smartcard.
This class never featured in official Android releases and was
subsequently removed from CyanogenMod to add support for
Google Wallet. As such, a version of CyanogenMod 9 built
between January 20th and March 22nd, 2012, is required
for the proxy device. Unfortunately most devices nowadays,
included those available to this project, never had such a build
made for them as they weren’t manufactured at that time.
Similarly, many of the devices made in early 2012 didn’t have
NFC incorporated into them.
However, Android on its own initiative introduced Hostbased Card Emulation (HCE) in late 2013 with Android
4.4 KitKat (API level 19) to allow for Android devices to
emulate credit/debit cards and be used in their place in contactless payment system. HCE fulfils what we were trying to
achieve with the IsoPcdA class – emulation of a smartcard.
As such, we set out to modify NFCProxy to use Android’s
HCE service instead. The Sony Xperia T device was chosen
for this purpose as the NFC driver for the chipset used in
the Nexus 7 (2012 version) does not support Host Card
Emulation, which is needed for the proxy device.
The NFC framework was largely overhauled in KitKat and
many changes were introduced. The most significant change
was the introduction of the HCE service; a background service that initially receives all APDUs before dispatching them
to any service registered to receive ADPUs from the reader
sending them. While this HCE service is useful for developers
of NFC payment apps, it unexpectedly hindered development
of our relay attack.

VOLUME 8, 2020

After exhausting other options, we decided that modifying
the framework of an existing build in situ would be the most
efficient approach. This was achieved by rooting a Sony
Xperia T device running CyanogenMod 11 (Android version 4.3.1; Jelly Bean). Once rooted, the framework.jar and
framework.odex files were pulled from /system/framework/.
These files were deodexed using the Java SE Development
Kit (JDK) and the dex2jar application. The classes.dex file
was extracted from the resultant jar files. This file was
deodexed as before and decompiled using Java Decompiler.
The required changes were made to the IsoDep, IsoPcdA,
IsoPcdB and TagTechnology classes. The classes file was
re-assembled and odexed using JDK, and inserted back into
the framework files. The framework files were then odexed as
necessary and pushed to the device while it was in recovery
mode, overwriting the old framework files. This process succeeded, allowing us to use NFCProxy and perform the relay
attack.
B. RELAY ATTACK RESULTS

The additional delay on the system imposed by the relay
attack was initially a concern. The overhead from processing on the relay devices and from the additional communication links could have caused timeouts, which would
cause the relay attack to fail. However, this was not
the case and the relay attack succeeded despite the extra
delays. Hancke’s [5] relay attack implementation attracted
a 15 - 20us delay whereas our application of this attack
amassed delays ranging from 14 ms to 68 ms, depending
largely on WiFi network congestion. This is a considerable
delay to introduce to a system; unexpectedly none of our
attacks failed due to timeout and loss of synchronisation. This
adds to the vulnerability of the technology.
We built a testbed consisting of a total of 7 debit and
credit cards from three Irish financial institutions, in addition to a developer pack of different NFC tags and form
factors purchased from RapidNFC. The payment terminals
tested included contactless-enabled vending machines from
bds Vending Solutions Ltd., an Ingenico iCT250 Point of
Sale (POS) terminal, a ViVOTech ViVOpay 4000 contactless
payment device, and a PN532 NFC controller breakout board
simulating POS transactions. The relay attack succeeded in
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all instances. No protection from relay attacks was afforded
by any of these devices.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE

We initially sought to frame our countermeasure on a
two-pass authentication mechanism between the reader and
the tag, in a manner similar to that defined in ISO/IEC
9798-2 [20]. Amongst the encrypted data exchanged would
be a temporal parameter, a timestamp, used to benchmark the
time taken for authentication of both parties. The time taken
would then be used to establish whether the communication
link was subject to a relay attack by detecting a higher RTT,
however this metric was limited. This method presented problems. Sufficient clock synchronicity is unlikely achievable
on low-cost passive NFC devices. Use of an asymmetric
algorithm would likely prove easier to implement in devices
currently in circulation but the resource greedy nature of
asymmetric algorithms would mean processing time on tags
would vary greatly, and thus the ability to detect a relay attack
is reduced and implementation becomes specific to the device
and form factor. It is apparent that an authentication-type
countermeasure would not be practical in this instance.
We propose a time measurement based countermeasure.
Our countermeasure seeks to prevent relay attacks by detecting the delays that they impose on the system. This permits an
upper bound to be established on the RTT of fixed size commands and responses, differentiating genuine transactions
from relayed transactions. Hancke [5] discusses the difficulty
faced by time checking countermeasures, caused by processing time variation and indeterminate data transfer delays,
however we argue that such variance can be bounded and
sufficiently accounted for to defend against common relay
attack setups. Indeed, relay attacks on NFC have evolved
from requiring technical expertise and custom-built hardware
to needing little more than a foundation level knowledge of
a mobile operating system and having access to common,
low-cost NFC-equipped smartphones. Consequently, the user
base capable of performing relay attacks on NFC devices has
grown from a handful of academics to a substantial cohort
of the general population, and correspondingly so too has the
potential for malicious use. It is this smartphone relay attack
implementation scenario that we believe presents the greatest
danger to the technology, ergo our countermeasure focuses
on mitigating this threat scenario.
This countermeasure differentiates itself from other proposed time-based countermeasures by its implementation at
the application layer. Previous solutions have focused on the
transmission protocol – defined by ISO/IEC 14443-4 [21].
Instead this approach operates on the ISO/IEC 7816-4 [22]
application layer protocol which is used by the majority of
NFC Forum Type 4 tags. While this makes our countermeasure unsuitable for simple NDEF record-holding tags (e.g.
NTAG203, Mifare Ultralight), these tags are typically not
used in security sensitive applications where relay attacks
pose a significant threat. Rather, it is Type 4 tag technology that is used for contactless payment, access control and
190112

other security-demanding applications. By integrating our
countermeasure further up the stack, its scope is naturally
reduced; however, this is offset by greater portability and
ease in deployment. Another significant reason for designing
the countermeasure around the ISO/IEC 7816-4 application
protocol is that the Android NFC API (in addition to the
Windows Phone Smartcard API and Apple Pay API) allows
for communication and message encapsulation solely via this
protocol. ISO/IEC 14443 protocol procedures are handled
exclusively by the device’s embedded NFC controller with a
limited controller interface available to the Android operating
system kernel. Furthermore, EMV technical standards for
contactless payments adopt the ISO/IEC 7816-4 protocol for
data exchange.
By measuring the RTT taken by a sufficient sample of successive APDUs, many common relay attack implementations
can be detected and prevented. The APDU used must have
specific attributes, which we will discuss in more detail. The
RTT measurement phase takes place after an NFC connection has been established and the initialisation sequence is
complete, and before transaction-related data is exchanged.
While the RTT taken differs with tag type and form factor,
our test results show that the delay caused by even a dedicated wireless communication channel with no other traffic
is substantial enough to build a generalised model with a high
detection rate, which will be discussed further in Section V.
The ISO/IEC 7816-4 protocol specifies the APDU structure and defines 39 APDU commands. Of these, the NFC
Forum specifies that only 3 of these must be supported by
NFC Forum Type 4 devices, leaving support for the remainder as optional and at device manufacturers’ discretion [23].
The three mandatory commands consist of SELECT (for the
selection of files or applications), READ BINARY (for reading data from a file), and UPDATE BINARY (for updating
of data in or to a file). For our countermeasure we required a
small, fixed-size command APDU (C-APDU) that was universally supported and that added little to no processing on the
recipient tag. Furthermore, the response APDU (R-APDU)
must also be fixed in size and of small size to curtail discrepancies due to data transfer delays. Accordingly, we opted for
our command APDU to be a SELECT command for the tag
to select the Master File record on that tag. This is similar
to selecting the root directory of a file system and is not
processing intensive. Furthermore, after the initial selection
any further command APDUs to select the same file record
incur a commensurate processing time allowing us to safely
attribute any variances to the communication link.
The structure of our command and response pair can be
seen in Figure 2. Notably, neither use their optional data field
for SELECT commands. The value of the response trailer for
the R-APDU may differ among devices, with some returning
‘‘6A 86’’ instead. While this indicates incorrect parameters
in the C-APDU, it in fact has no bearing on our countermeasure and can marginally reduce processing time which
is a beneficial consequence. The C-APDU and R-APDU are
4 bytes and 2 bytes, respectively, at the application layer.
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 2. Command and response pair structure.

Depending on parameters selected at initialisation, the frame
size is between 3 and 5 bytes larger for both when overhead
from lower layers is accounted for. At the default bit rate
of 106 kbit/s, this results in a theoretical transmission time
of 528 – 679 µs for the command, and 377 – 528 µs for its
response; an acceptably small time for delays incurred by a
wireless network used as a relay channel, for example, to be
detectable.
Algorithm 1 Relay Attack Countermeasure Strategy
1: int i ← 0, sum ← 0, sumdev ← 0
2: int rApdu, cApdu ← ‘‘\x00\xA4\x00\x00’’
3: int[N ] rtt
4: float mean, stddev
5:
6:
7:
8:

while i < N do
Start timeri
rApdu ← send(cApdu)
9:
End timeri
10:
rtt[i] ← timeri
11:
i++
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:

for i ← 1, i++, while i < N do
sum rtt[i]
if i = N − 1 then
mean ← sum/(N − 1)
for i ← 1, i++, while i < N do
sumdev (rtt[i] − mean)2
if i = N − 1 then
√
stddev ← sumdev/(N − 1)
if mean > TMAX then
End transaction
else if stddev > STDDEVMAX then
End transaction
else
Transaction continues

Algorithm 1 shows the protocol for our countermeasure.
The initialisation sequence of the NFC devices has been
omitted as this is handled by the NFC controller and is
VOLUME 8, 2020

immaterial to this algorithm. Values for TMAX , the maximum
permissible mean RTT, and STDDEVMAX are imperative to the
functionality of the protocol and are discussed in Section V.
These variables represent the upper bounds established to
distinguish between genuine systems and those subject to a
relay attack. This protocol should commence immediately
after activation of the transmission protocol has completed.
The countermeasure algorithm begins by gathering timing
samples of the round trip time taken for the PCD to send the
chosen C-APDU and receive the R-APDU (lines 6 – 12). The
mean (lines 14 – 20) and standard deviation (lines 22 – 28)
of the RTT sample are then computed. Note that the first
RTT value obtained is omitted in these calculations as our
tests have consistently found that the first timing tends to
be an outlier and unrepresentative of the remainder of the
sample taken. If either the mean RTT or the standard deviation
between the RTT values obtained exceeds these threshold
values, the connection is dropped before application data is
exchanged (lines 30 – 33). Else, the transaction may proceed
and is handed off to the application supported by the devices
as no relay attack has been detected. The risk presented by
relay attacks is thus mitigated when this countermeasure is
implemented as described.
V. VALIDATION

With NFC now being integrated into most modern smartphones, the equipment required to perform a relay attack on
the technology is readily accessible. It is this particular threat
scenario that this countermeasure attempts to protect against.
As such, this countermeasure was built around the Android
OS framework and designed to defend against the relay attack
implementation described in Section III. Results presented in
this section were obtained from tests carried out on such a
relay attack setup. An Adafruit PN532 NFC controller board
was used as the Active device and Passive devices tested
included a DESFIRE 4k access card, MIFARE credit cards
from two financial institutions, a MIFARE automated fare
collection card, and an Irish passport.
Taking the C-APDU/R-APDU pair as discussed in
Section IV, we examined the round-trip time incurred by
sending the C-APDU from the PCD to the contactless card,
processing the command on the card, and replying with the
R-APDU from the contactless card to the PCD over NFC.
Experiments to investigate this were undertaken for both
uninterrupted and relay attack setups. We discovered from
10,000 tests on each card that there is a considerable difference in the RTT of a genuine, uninterrupted transaction
over NFC and one relayed over a dedicated WiFi network
with no other traffic. In addition, we found that the RTT
varies only slightly in genuine transactions, with a standard
deviation of 112 – 267 µs depending on the card tested, while
relayed transactions deviate wildly from the mean, with a
standard deviation in the range of 10,473 – 22,314 µs in our
tests, as can be seen in Figure 3. From these results a twopart algorithm based on mean RTT values and their standard
deviation was devised.
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FIGURE 3. RTT for countermeasure command-response protocol in both
uninterrupted and relay attack setups for 10,000 samples.

Finding suitable upper limits, in order to distinguish
between genuine and relayed transactions, for both the mean
and standard deviation of a sample of RTT values remains
a challenge. This is predominantly due to the variety of
different form factors, chipsets and antennae used by NFC
devices which can all effect the typical RTT of samples
during the measurement phase of our countermeasure algorithm. An ideal solution may take the form of a database of
standard RTT values for each NFC device, or a hard-coded
value in the memory of passive NFC devices representing an
acceptable upper limit on the RTT. As the difference in the
RTT for genuine and relayed transactions was found to be
in the order of tens of milliseconds, a more realistic solution
presented itself in the form of establishing a generalised upper
bound, as implemented in our algorithm. Values for TMAX and
STDDEVMAX were fixed at 20 ms and 500 µs, respectively.
20 ms was selected for TMAX as it is greater than the mean RTT
plus three standard deviations (14.58 ms) that we encountered
for a genuine transaction, yet lower than the minimum RTT
(23.97 ms) for a relayed transaction, and allows for some
padding. STDDEVMAX was set at 500 µs for similar reasons
and lies between the standard deviation of genuine transactions (mean: 175.56 µs) and relayed transactions (mean:
14,281.33 µs).
With these upper bounds in place and the countermeasure implemented as described in Algorithm 1, we initiated
10,000 transactions for each of our test devices in uninterrupted and relayed systems. Our countermeasure yielded a
100% detection rate in these tests and had a false positive
rate of 0.38% – 0.86%. These results suggest that a timebased countermeasure to relay attacks is viable, at least
in the circumstances we examined. Less than 1 in every
100 transactions were falsely classified as being the subject of
a relay attack and so the user experience was not significantly
impacted. Figure 4 shows the vast majority of transactions fall
well below TMAX and how the typical RTT can vary between
different passive NFC devices.
An important consideration in implementing this countermeasure was determining what constitutes a sufficient sample
for the amount of RTT values obtained. Ease of use and
expedient transactions are core values of NFC. With a sample
190114

FIGURE 4. RTT for countermeasure command-response protocol with
genuine transactions for 10,000 samples and 5 NFC devices. TMAX ,
the countermeasure’s upper bound for the mean RTT, is also shown.

size too large, the temporal overhead incurred by sending
and receiving APDUs during the measurement phase will
degrade the user experience. If the sample size is too small,
the countermeasure may fail to detect a relay attack. Over
10,000 iterations we tested our countermeasure algorithm
with sample sizes of 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, and 50. RTT per
command and response pair was in the range of 11 – 14 ms,
depending on the Passive device. A sample size as low as
10 was found to be satisfactory in most cases, however when
accounting for human interaction a sample size of 20 allowed
for a tolerance of outliers caused by user movement to or from
the PCD. This lengthened transactions by 0.22 seconds.
VI. RELATED WORK

This section will provide a review of the literature and discuss
other possible countermeasures to our relay attack implementation. Countermeasures can be broadly divided into two
categories based on their principle mechanism of action – that
is to say either physical or logical.
A. PHYSICAL APPROACHES

The biggest challenge an attacker faces when seeking to
perform a relay attack is gaining access to the victim’s
credit/debit card (similarly this applies to other NFC-based
smartcards and tags). An attacker doesn’t necessarily need
to be within the typical reading distance of the card; with
the right equipment, and in particular the right antenna [24],
the attack can reach a card from nearly half a meter
away, if not further. Most generic wallets and purses offer
little-to-no protection from relay attacks and do not block
signal propagation in a significant way. However some materials such as aluminium do block NFC communications and,
accordingly, could prevent an attacker from reading a contactless card. A simple, yet effective, method would be to shield
contactless cards when not being used. While it is unlikely
anyone would want to wrap their credit cards in aluminium
foil, a wallet or card holder with an embedded metallic mesh
would shield cards from being read by an attacker. Such
wallets already exist for RFID [25] and these RFID-blocking
wallets also work for NFC. They operate on the principle that
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a Faraday cage is created around the card which causes any
external electric field to dissipate across the embedded mesh,
and thus preventing it from reaching the card. Lining the card
slots of ones wallet with aluminium foil works equally well
however; in fact only a thickness of 27 microns of aluminium
is needed to function as a barrier [26].
As the use of shielding is user-dependent, a physical
authentication mechanism introduced at the manufacturing
stage is favoured. The most basic implementation of this
may be to disable the NFC module in contactless cards by
default and to introduce a button, which when pressed and
held would enable the NFC module. More advanced solutions
take the form of requiring the user to enter a PIN code
on such a card to authenticate themselves and enable card
functionality. In 2012, MasterCard c launched a new line
of credit cards, named ‘Display Cards’ [27], which feature
an embedded LCD display and touch-sensitive capacitive
buttons ranging from 0 to 9 in addition to ‘Ok’, ‘Cancel’,
and ‘On/Off’ buttons. While early models did not feature
a contactless interface, newer models have been released
with an embedded NFC controller. MasterCard’s Display
Card technology is primarily aimed towards authentication
for online banking services but it would serve equally well as
a two-factor authentication mechanism for NFC transactions.
The fingerprinting of NFC devices based on modulation
patterns and spectral characteristics could be used to prevent
relay attacks. Consider a case where NFC tags are assessed at
the manufacturing stage and features specific to the individual
tag’s waveform are extracted. These identifiers are then used
to build a fingerprint unique to the tag which is digitally
signed and stored in a locked region of the tag’s memory.
When the tag is presented to a reader, the reader queries the
tag for its fingerprint and then performs its own analysis of the
tag’s waveform using the same process as the manufacturer,
thus generating its own fingerprint for the device. If both
fingerprints match, the transaction proceeds. In the event of a
relay attack, the fingerprints would fail to match as the reader
would have generated a fingerprint for the proxy device
instead. The feasibility of such a countermeasure is premised
on individual tags varying enough from the manufacturing
process to allow for the generation of unique fingerprints,
and on readers being able to accurately derive these fingerprints. The work of Danev et al. [28] on the fingerprinting
of HF-RFID devices shows that this is in fact achievable.
Using their identification technique over 50 smart cards of the
same type and manufacturer, and operating on the 13.56 MHz
frequency, they attained an Equal Error Rate of 2.43% with a
single run and 4.38% over two runs. The size of their generated fingerprint is approximately 120 bytes and could fit on
the vast majority of NFC tags. We have some considerations
regarding the use of such a technique in practice, namely
the unlikeliness of tags to be kept fixed with regard to the
acquisition antenna of the reader when being measured and
how this might affect the accuracy of fingerprint generation.
We also regard 2 seconds for feature extraction as too significant of an impact on the user experience for this technique
VOLUME 8, 2020

to be deployed as is, however we share the authors’ opinion
that performance could be significantly improved with a more
efficient hardware implementation. We believe fingerprinting
countermeasures for NFC warrants further investigation and
we intend to examine these in future work.
Although effective, a physical counter measure isn’t
always practical. The range of RFID blocking wallets and
purses available is limited and big fashion labels don’t incorporate this feature into their products. Likewise, lining card
holders with aluminium foil is displeasing to the eye and
lessens the user experience, which is one of the big attractions of NFC technology. We also can’t discount the fact
that users must remove their card at some point to use it; at
which point the card will be exposed and vulnerable to relay
attacks. Similarly, any on/off button to enable the NFC module would still leave a window of time during a transaction
whereby the card is susceptible to attack, albeit brief. With
our relay attack implementation taking less than 4 seconds
to complete a transaction, a card need not be exposed for
long to be exploited by a malicious attacker. The promise
shown by MasterCard’s Display Card is similarly negated by
its lack of adoption by financial institutions, with interested
therein waning. A significant problem faced by any physical
integration of a means for authentication is that it increases
transaction time and thus abates the user experience. For these
reasons a logical counter measure is more appropriate.
B. LOGICAL APPROACHES

A review of the literature discovered limited success in preventing relay attacks on NFC and related technologies. The
counter measures proposed focus on the changes introduced
to a system by a relay attack — distance and time — and seek
to measure them in order to differentiate a normal transaction
from one under a relay attack.
Hancke and Kuhn [29] devised a distance-bounding protocol for RFID systems aimed at simple, low-power hardware, akin to that of Passive NFC tags. The cryptographic
protocol works on the premise of the Round-Trip Time (RTT)
of signals being accurately calculated, but requires a high
bandwidth channel. They acknowledge that their distancebounding protocol would be unsuitable for technologies operating on the 13.56 MHz carrier frequency due its low data
bandwidth in the magnitude of 300 KHz. For the ISO/IEC
14443-A standard, and thus most NFC communications, their
system could only resolve distance to one kilometer rendering
it only partially effective against our relay attack. Brands
and Chaum [30], pioneers in the field of distance bounding,
describe the original distance-bounding protocol with a lower
false acceptance rate, but it notably lacks the noise resilience
of that of Hancke and Kuhn, and a practical implementation
was never proposed by the authors, much less for NFC.
More recent protocols, such as Fischlin and Onete’s [31],
have brought us closer to a usable distance bounding solution
however there is still much work to be done in this field
and many challenges to overcome before distance-bounding
protocols become a practical countermeasure to relay attacks.
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Boureanu and Vaudenay [32] highlight possible integration
solutions for distance-bounding protocols in typical RFID
and NFC applications. They hold that for contactless payment
systems, for example, a solution lies in public-key distance
bounding – of which there are only two such protocols in the
literature. Of these two protocols, neither afford protection
against terrorist fraud attacks, which are a form of relay
attack that attempts to misrepresent the distance between
the legitimate parties in the transaction. Further work in this
field towards public-key distance-bounding protocols has the
potential to produce an effective countermeasure to relay
attacks in NFC. It should also be mentioned that there is no
provision in the standards allowing for a distance-bounding
protocol and thus any solution of this nature would be incompatible with current standards [33], [34].
Alhothaily et al. [35] propose a multi-factor verification
approach to prevent various attacks by using multi-possession
factor authentication with distance bounding in the verification process. This requires the user to use a bank card
and a personal device to verify a transaction. This approach
requires additional configuration, extra hardware, and results
in a longer transaction time.
Hu et al. in [36] explored methods for the detection of
wormhole attacks on wireless ad-hoc networks. A wormhole
attack is synonymous with a relay attack in conceptual terms
but can be more broadly varied in actual execution; its use
is more predominant in the literature for wireless sensor networks. Their solution to this threat was to add information to
packets being transmitted such that this information could be
used to impose an upper bound on the transmission distance
allowed for the packet. This was coined a ‘‘packet leash’’ and
two types were described – geographical leashes and temporal leashes. Construction of geographical leashes require
nodes to know their own location, thus making the construct inapplicable to most NFC technology implementations.
Certain NFC-enabled mobile phones with location services
may pose as candidates for use of this detection mechanism
when being used in peer-to-peer mode. Temporal leashes
require nodes to have tightly synchronised clocks with the
maximum permissible deviation between each node’s clock
being in the scale of hundreds of nanoseconds to a few
microseconds. Achieving this level of clock synchronicity
falls outside of the capabilities of common NFC devices.
It is possible that this clock synchronisation accuracy may
be achievable on NFC devices with an integrated Global
Positioning System (GPS) [37]. In practice, it is our opinion
that a counter measure to NFC relay attacks based on packet
leashes is not feasible due to the limitations of NFC devices in
circulation.
Weiß [34] proposes a solution based on time measurement.
They note that relay attacks impose additional delays on
RTT during the challenge-response protocol and suggest that
vendors determine an average RTT value for their application
during this protocol. From this, vendors can then set a maximum threshold at which they decline to proceed with communication if exceeded. Although this is effective against some
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relay attacks, and successfully prevented Weiß’s relay attack
implementation, it is overly specific. Its implementation on
the ISO/IEC 14443 protocol stack presents possible standards
compliance issues. This countermeasure also fails to account
for design variances among different NFC tags and smartcards, and how these variances can affect response times.
This issue is compounded by the use of AES encryption in
the challenge-response protocol which introduces processing
time variation as a new unconsidered variable. Furthermore,
Weiß acknowledges that each terminal system would have to
be evaluated and adjusted separately which would incur a disproportionate effort to implement on a large-scale. Therefore,
we do not consider this counter measure a viable solution in
its current form.
In comparison, our countermeasure is compliant with the
standards by being implemented at the application layer.
Processing time was accounted for in all of our tests and
we have accounted for variances that may occur in a
practical setting. The effectiveness of our countermeasure
is comparable with Weiß and we believe that our proposal could be deployed even without individual terminal
evaluation.
VII. CONCLUSION

A low operating range may be seen as advantageous to a
wireless communication technology used for security sensitive applications but it should not be relied on as a security
mechanism in its own right. With NFC this is too often the
case despite many documented relay attacks on the technology. The problem is compounded by technical standards
that fail to provide adequate protection to the communication
channel and require revision to add support for distancebounding protocols. We successfully implemented a relay
attack over a WiFi network using inexpensive, readily available Android smartphones. As vulnerabilities in contactless
payment systems would have serious implications, we subjected these systems to our relay attack. The relay attack
succeeded, further highlighting that NFC is not an appropriate wireless communication technology for security critical
systems.
In an effort to mitigate the threat posed by this kind of
attack, we proposed an application-layer countermeasure that
aims to detect overhead added by relaying communications
over an additional communication channel. This countermeasure succeeded with a detection rate of 100% for the
50,000 instances it was tested over. While not all relay
attack implementations will cause sufficient overhead to be
detected, it is apparent that relay attacks on NFC over WiFi
are detectable. In future work on this subject, we intend to
investigate the applicability of our countermeasure to other
common relay communication channels, such as Bluetooth.
A trade-off to our approach is the additional time required
to process a transaction, however, in our experiments the
average delay was 0.22 seconds, which would have a negligible impact on the user experience of contactless payment or access control.
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